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WELFARE AND THE WELL-BEING OF
CHILDREN: THE RELATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CASH AND
IN-KIND TRANSFERS
ABSTRACT
Cash transfers to families with children are increasingly being restricted to parents
who work, while families of non-working parents are receiving a progressively larger shareof
their benefits in kind. This paper provides an evaluation of the empirical evidence regarding
the effects of in-kind and cash transfer programs on the children who are their intended
beneficiaries. A distinction is made between in-kind transfer programs, such as the Food
Stamp Program, that provide transfers to families that are earmarked for certain purposes, and
programs such as Medicaid that provide specific services directly to children. Although the
evidence is incomplete, it suggests that in-kind programs have stronger effects on children
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and NEERIntroduction
Although the public identifies the term swelfare* with cash transfers to
single mothers under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC)
cash transfers are increasingly being restricted to parents who work. The non-
working poor are receiving a progressively larger share of their benefits in kind
(Moffitt, 1992) .Ina world in which governments could always identify the
intended beneficiaries and issues of intra-household resource allocation did not
arise, in-kind transfers to poor families would be an inefficient way to increase
the well-being of poor children. The "first-best' solution would be to allow
families on welfare to choose the basket of goods that best suited their needs.
In reality, it is necessary to design welfare programs that discourage
those outside the targeted population from applying. Nichols and Zeckhauser
(1982) show that if governments can identify goods that are valued more highly
by the deserving poor than by potential "imposters", then providing these
benefits in kind is a more efficient way to transfer resources than providing
cash, because fewer resources will be directed to imposters. Besley and Coate
(1992) provide a similar analysis of requirements that welfare participants work.
These papers provide a theoretical justification for restrictions on cash welfare
and for the growing emphasis on in-kind transfers. The literature on intra-
household resource allocation further suggests that policy makers should be
concerned with how resources are utilized within the family)
This paper provides an evaluation of the empirical evidence regarding the
effects of 8 large federal cash and in-kind transfer programs on the children who
are their intended beneficiaries. It is convenient to divide in-kind transfers
into two groups: Those that provide transfers to the families of poor children
that are earmarked for certain purposes (e.g. food stamps) ,andthose that
provide specific services directly to children (e.g. Medicaid) .Theevidence
reviewed here suggests that in-kind programs have stronger effects on children
than cash transfers, and that the more narrowly targeted the program, the larger
For example, Thomas (1993) discusses the effects of allocating resources
to mothers rather than to fathers.
1the effects.
The first part of the paper provides an overview of the major federal
welfare programs that benefit children and documents the trends towards in-kind
benefits, and towards restrictions on cash transfers. Measures of child well-
being are also discussed. The second section discusses the evidence regarding
the effects of cash transfers on children. In-kind transfers are analyzed in
Part 3, and the relative efficacy of earmarked vs. more narrowly targeted
programs is discussed. Conclusions appear in Part 4.
1. ackground
a) An Overview of the Federal Welfare System2
Figure 1 shows the evolution of federal expenditures on the eight largest
welfare programs benefitting children. Administrative costs are excluded
whenever possible, as are state matching contributions for AFDC and Medicaid.
Expenditures (in real 1990 dollars) have been divided into cash transfers and two
types of in-kind transfers: 'Earmarked programs include food stamps and housing
assistance, while 'targeted" programs include Medicaid, Head Start, the national
School Lunch Program (NSLP), and the Special Supplemental Feeding Program for
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) .Thefigure shows the remarkable increase in
in-kuid relative to cash benefits: While cash transfers grew only 18% between
1975 and 1990, in-kind transfers shot up 51%. Earmarked programs make up the
bulk of expenditures on in-kind programs, but the two types of in-kind programs
have shown roughly equal growth over time.3
Figure 2 provides a more detailed breakdown of the evolution of
expenditures in each of the three categories, while Table 1 gives the amounts
spent in 1975, 1980 and 1990. Table 2 provides information about caseloads in
2tlnless otherwise noted, the information in this section comes from the U.S.
House of Representatives (1991, 1992)
It is interesting to compare these outlays on children to federal
expenditures on the elderly. In 1990, the federal government spent $1,020 per
child under 18 compared to $11,350. per elderly person (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1992). The largest component of spending on the elderly was
Social Security which came to $193 billion.
2these three years. The rest of this section provides background information
about the programs described in these Tables.
i) Cash Transfers
As shown in Figure 2 and Table 1, cash transfers can be divided into
expenditures on AFOC, and outlays under the Earned Income Tax Credit. AFDC was
originally authorized under the Social Security Act of 1935 as a federal-state
matching entitlement program that would provide assistance to fatherless
children.' As of October 1, 1990, states are also required to offer an AFOC
Unemployed Parent {AFDC-UP) program to two-parent families in which the principle
earner is unemployed.5
AFDC is administered at the state level within federal guidelines --states
choose the need and payment standards that determine eligibility, set income and
asset limits, and choose benefit levels. As a result, program characteristics
vary widely from state to state. For example, as of January 1991, the maximum
monthly AFDC grant for a one-parent family of 4 persons varied from $124. in
Alabama to $891. in Alaska. By way of comparison, the federal poverty line for
a family of 4 persons was $13,942. On average the federal government pays 54%
of benefit costs, as shown in Table 1.
Figure 2 shows that expenditures on the AFDC program have been declining
gradually over time. In view of the fact that the maximum AFDC benefit for a
family of four in the median state fell by 33% between 1975 and 1990, and the
decline in the AFDC caseload documented in Table 2, it is remarkable that total
expenditures have not fallen further. Since two, 2-person families are more
expensive than a single 4-person family, these figures may reflect a shift in the
composition of the caseload towards smaller families.
Table 1 shows that the slack in AFDC growth has been taken up by growth in
expenditures on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which doubled between 1975
and 1990. Table 2 shows that the growth in expenditures was accompanied by a
The fact that it is an entitlement program means that anyone who meets the
eligibility criteria is entitled to receive benefits.
Only 5% of AFDC families qualified under this program in 1990.
3doubling of the caseload over the same period. The EITC was introduced in 1975
as a means of granting tax relief to low-income tax payers. In 1992, the maximun
EITC was $1,324. for tax payers with one qualifying child and $1,384. for tax
payers with any additional qualifying children. The EITC begins to be phased out
for tax payers with adjusted gross income (AGI) above $11,840. and is completely
phased out for tax payers with AGI greater than $22,370.
Because it is administered through the tax system, the EITC is not usually
viewed as a welfare program.However, unlike most tax credits, the EITC is
'refundable", that is, if the amount of the credit exceeds the tax-payer's
federal income tax liability, then the difference is refunded. Table 1 shows
that in fact most EITC expenditures were outlays of this kind rather than
foregone tax dollars. The EITC differs from traditional cash welfare programs
primarily because the majority of recipients work, and benefits are available to
all kinds of families.
ii) Earmarked Programs
As discussed above, expenditures on earmarked programs can be divided into
expenditures on the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and outlays for housing assistance.
The Food Stamp Program grew out of efforts to transfer surplus agricultural
commodities to the needy during the Great Depression. These programs had been
formalized and extended to all counties by 1973 (Clarkson, 1975) .Foodstamps
are issued in the form of booklets of coupons which may be used to purchase all
foods except alcohol, tobacco, and hot foods "intended for immediate
consumption." In contrast to AFDC, Food Stamps are available to all families who
meet federally determined income-eligibility reqtirements, though AFDC recipients
are automatically eligible. Interactions between the FSP and AFDC provide the
only source of state-to-state variation in food stamp benefits --FSPincome is
reduced by $30 for every dollar of countable income (including AFDC benefits),
once certain disregards are applied.6
Table 1 indicates that expenditures on the Food Stamp Program grew by 50%
between1975 and 1990, while Table 2 shows that caseloads rose only 25%. Hence,
See U.S. House of Representatives (1992) for details.
4the increased generosity of food stamp benefits made up part of the loss in cash
transfers for AFDC households. However, Figure 3 illustrates the fact that in
1992, even combined AFDC and food stamp benefits were not high enough to bring
families up to the poverty level in most States.
Housing assistance has been provided since 1937 under the auspices of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) .Incontrast to AFDC and food
stamps, housing assistance is not an entitlement: When funds allocated to the
program run out, people who are eligible must be wait-listed. It is estimated
that about half of federal expenditures on housing assistance directly benefit
children while the elderly are the other large group of beneficiaries. T h e
federal goverruttent offers mortgage assistance to low-income rural households, but
most expenditures are on rental assistance programs.
The major forms in which rental assistance is offered are: 1) low-rent
public housing, 2) Section 8 new construction/substantial rehabilitation, and 3)
Section 8 existing housing. t.ow-rent public housing is what most people think
of as "public housing". The Section 8 programs were established by the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974. Under the new construction/rehabilitation
part of the program, the federal government subsidizes the rents of apartments
brought into the stock by private developers. The Section 8 existing housing
program provides rent subsidies to families who find an apartment of their own
choosing, as long as the rent is below the "Fair Market Rent" established by MUD,
and the unit meets minimum quality standards.Rental assistance typically
reduces a family's rental payments to 30% of its income, after deductions for
certain expenses are taken into account.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that since 1982, over two-thirds
of new authorizations for rental housing assistance were for Section 8 progrars
(Pedone, 1988) .Themain rationale for this shift in policy is that itis
cheaper to house a family in an existing unit under a voucher program than it s
to build new public housing units (Apgar, 1990) .Hence,more families can be
served for the same budget outlay. Tables 1 and 2 show that both outlays on
housing assistance and the caseload grew by roughly 66% between 1975 and 1990.
5iii) Services Targeted Directly to Children
Finally, turning to services targeted directly to children, Figure 2
indicates that the largest program of this kind is Medicaid.The Medicaid
program provides health insurance to eligible poor families and to the aged,
blind, and disabled.It was created in 1966 as a federal-state matching
entitlement with the stated goal of eliminating financial barriers to medical
care. Table 1 shows that expenditures on children account for a relatively small
share of total Medicaid expenditures: The average expenditure on an AFDC child
is $682. compared to $5928. for an aged person and $1290 for an AFDC adult (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1991) .Notwithstandingchildren's relatively small
share of Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid is the single most important health
insurance program for poor children. accounting for over 55% of public
expenditures on child health.
States are required to offer Medicaid coverage to AFDC recipients and to
AFDC-UP families and until recent extensions of coverage to other groups, there
was a very close linkage between AFDC recipiency and Medicaid eligibility.
However, evidence that many children and pregnant women were not receiving
adequate preventive care led Congress to begin extending Medicaid coverage for
pregnant women and children in 1984.States are now required to cover all
pregnant women and children under 6 with family income less than 133% of the
federal poverty line, regardless of family structure.' As of July 1, 1991,
states were also required to cover all children bornafterSeptember 30, 1983
whose family incomes were less than 100% of the federal poverty line.
Tables 1 and 2 show that expenditures on children under the Medicaid
program have risen dramatically since 1975, although caseloads grew only slowly.
This increase in Medicaid costs reflects an increase in the Cost per visit that
is also occurring in the non-Medicaid population )Newhouse, 1992) .The
relatively stagnant caseload may reflect low takeup rates among newly eligible
children.
'The coverage of pregnant women is limited to services related to the
pregnancy.
6Other large programs that target services directly to children include
school nutrition programs, WIC, and Head Start.Figure 2 indicates that.
relative to the growth in expenditures on 'earmarked' programs and on Medicaid,
there has been only modest growth in these three targeted programs: Total
expenditures on the School Lunch Program, WIC and Head Start increased only 20%
between 1975 and 1990.However, Table 1 shows that this aggregate masks
considerable variation in individual program trends, For example, expenditures
on WIC doubled, while outlays on Head Start grew 60%, and expenditures on the
NLSP actually fell 18%.
The federal government supportS 7 programs that provide meals or monthly
food supplements to low-income children. The largest are the National School
Lunch Program (NSLP), the School Breakfast Program (SBP) ,andWIC. The NSLP and
SB? are entitlements that operate by reimbursing schools for each meal served.
WIC is funded by appropriation and the size of each year's appropriation limits
the number of people that can be served.
The NSLP was begi.n in 1946 in response to national concern about the fact
that one-third of World War II draftees suffered nutrition-related deficiencies
that made them unfit for service. The NSLP is by far the largest of the child
nutrition programs: In 1981, lunches were served to approximately 25 million
students in 98% of the public schools --enoughto feed 60% of all students
attending public schools (Radzikowski and Gale, l984a) .However,Table 2 shows
that the total number of children served had fallen more than 50% by 1990.
School lunches are provided free to children with family incomes less than 130%
of the federal poverty line, and are subsidized if the family income falls
between 130 and 185% of the poverty line. Table 2 shows that the number of
children receiving free lunches has remained relatively constant over time at
about 10 million, while the number receiving reduced-price meals declined 50%
between 1975 and 1990, from 27 to 13 million.
The School Breakfast Program was instituted in 1966. It serves far fewer
See Jones (1990, 1992) for further inforiation about school nutrition
programs, and WIC.
7children than the lunch program: In 1981, about 4 million breakfasts were served
i33,000schools, enough to feed about 10% of the public school Student body.'
PartIcipants in the SaP tend to be poorer than participants in the NSLP --with
the result that the majority of school breakfasts have always been served free.
The WIC program provides nutritional counseling and food supplements o
pregnant and lactating mothers and their infants as well as to low-income
children up to age 5. It is currently operated out of some 8,330 sites. The
law requires that the WIC program provide foods containing protein, iron.
calcium, vitamin A, and vitamin C. Food packages must be appropriately tailored
to meet the needs of each category of recipient." In fiscal year 1991, the
average monthly WIC package was valued at $31.67.
WIC Participants must have family incomes less than 185% of the poverty
line, (though states may set income thresholds as low as 100% of the poverty
line), and must be certified to be nutritionally at risk .' Participantsmust
be re-certified at intervals in order to continue in the program. Table 2
indicates that the WIC caseload shot up 400% between 1975 and 1990, far
outstripping the increase in expenditures discussed above. WIC currently serves
an estimated 60% of those eligible.According to the Congressional Budget
Office, it would have cost $3.75 billion, or 44% more than that year's
appropriation, to serve all those who were eligible in 1992,
Head Start is a federal-local matching grant program that aims to improve
the learning skills, social skills, and health Status of poor children so that
they can begin schooling on an equal footing with their more advantaged peers.
Federal guidelines require that 90% of the children served be from families with
incomes below the federal poverty line. Given that there are over 1300 Head
St.art programs (Hayes et al. ,1990),all administered at a local level, there is
'These numbers have remained relatively constant over time.
:0Thecategories are children 0 to 3 months of age, 4 to 12 months, women
and children with special dietary needs, children from 1 to 5,pregnant and
nursing mothers, and postpartwn non-nursing mothers.
"Evaluationof Wic is complicated by the fact that providers do not use
uniform criteria for certifying nutritional risk.
Sa great deal of variation in program content.
Begun in 1964 as part of President Johnson's "War on Poverty', Head Start
is one element of that program that has enjoyed great public and bi-partisan
support. Former President Bush and President Clinton both pledged to increase
federal funding so that all eligible children may be served. In 1992, 622,000
children, roughly 28% of eligible 3 to 5 year olds, were served at a cost of $2.2
billion (Stewart, 1992). Table 2 shows that this represents an increase in the
caseload of 69% between 1975 and 1990.
In summary, cash transfers are increasingly being restricted to parents who
work.Parents who do not, are receiving an increasing proportion of their
assistance in the form of in-kind benefits. However, only a relatively small
share of these benefits are in the form of specific services provided directly
to children.The lion's share are provided to families in the form of
certificates that must be spent on food or housing.
b) Measures of Child Well-Being
Despite the fact that the programs discussed above are designed to benefit
children, there has been remarkably little research aimed at assessing the direct
effects on child well-being. Much of the difficulty lies in finding data sets
with information about both welfare participation and child outcomes. Ideally,
one would like to examine a range of outcomes since the effects of participation
are likely to be complex. For example, while Medicaid participation might be
expected to improve children's health, it may also have positive effects on
schooling attainment if poor health would otherwise have impaired the child's
performance. This section describes the three classes of outcomes that are the
focus of this review: Measures of health, measures of cognition and schooling
attainment, and measures of long-run social competence.
i) Measures of Health Status
Infant and child mortality rates are perhaps the most objective and least
controversial measures of children's health status. The infant mortality rate
is defined as the number of babies born alive who die before reaching age 1. At
10 per 1000, the U.S. infant mortality rate is higher than that of any other
9ndustria1ized country, and African-American rates are twice as high as white
rates )Danzinger and Stern, 1990) .Aclosely related measure of infant health
is birthweight --in1980 infants less than 2500 grams accounted for less than
7% of all births, but 60% of infant deaths (U.S. House ofRepresentatives,1992)
Gestational age is also used as a measure of neonatal health, but is subject to
a great deal more measurement error than birthweight.
Height-for-age is an anthropometric measure of the health and nutritional
status of older children (for babies the equivalent measure is length-for-age)
Physical anthropoligists have concluded that ethnic differentials in these
measures are relatively mioor for young children, although they become more
important after puberty. Since growth varies systematically with age and gender,
heights are usually standardized using guidelines from the National Center for
Health Statistics.12 The incidence of low height-for-age )stunting) is much
greater among poor than among non-poor children.For example, a 1983 study
carried out by the Massachusetts Department of Health found that 9.8% of
preschool children in Massachusetts had a height-for-age below the 5th percentile
of the NCHS standards )Massachusetts Department of Health, 1983)
Nutritional status can also be assessed using information about the
nutrients available" in a family's usual diet, individual nutrient intakes, or
biochemical tests. Low-income American children are at risk of iron and zinc
deficiencies, and often lack vitamin C.For example, Devaney, Haines, and
Moffitt (1989) found that 20.6% of 1 to 2 year old children in low-income
households suffered iron anemia compared to 6.7% of 1 to 2 year olds from higher
income households. These deficiencies have been linked to growth retardation,
lethargy, impaired immune status, and learning problems.
A third class of measures deal with the child's utilization of medical
services.Measures such as the number of doctor visits for illness are
problematic since they are affected both by illness and by the propensity to
utilize care. Visits for preventive care provide cleaner measures of
utilization.Prenatal care is another important type of preventive care.
"SeeCurrie and Thomas (1993b) for further details.
10Prenatal care that is adequate in terms of timely initiation and the total number
of visits has been showntosignificantly reduce the risk of lowbirthweight and
infant mortJty (Institute of Medicine, 1985)
ii) Test Scores and Schooling Attainment
Academic achievement is a very important determinant of a child's success
in our society: Each additional year of high school is estimated to raise future
wages by as much as 8%.'It is not surprising then, that many tests of
academic achievement have been developed. These tests are controversiab
African-Americ s obtain poorer scores than whites, and depending on the test,
girls may outperform boys or vice-versa. And it is not clear that these tests
are ultimately good predictors of academic success, once measures of a child's
background are adequately controlled for.More direct measures of academic
attainment include whether the child has ever taken remedial courses or been
retained in grade.There is a great deal of evidence which suggests that
children who lag behind their peers even at early ages are at higher risk of
eventually dropping out of highschool (Ensminger and Slusarcick, 1992)
iii) Longer-Term Measures
The ultimate measure of the success of a welfare program is the long-run
situationof children whose families participated.Are they less likely to
become pregnant as teenagers, to be unemployed, or ultimately to have their own
children participate in welfare programs? It has proven extremely difficult to
answer this question because it is difficult to sort out the effects of welfare
participationfromtheeffectsoffamily background andcorrcnunity
characteristics.
P&rt 2: Do Ca.hTzanufariDsn.fit Ci1dr.n?
a) Effects of AFDC
Most research about the effects of AFDC on children, focuses on the
question of whether daughters of women who participate in AFDC arethemselves
more likely to participate (c.f. Gottschalk, 1990). Critics ofthe welfare
system, point to the intergenerational transmission of welfaredependency as
"SeeAngrist (1990) for a recent estimate.
11evidence that parental welfare participation actually harms poor children by
affecting their aspirations (c.f. Murray, 1984).However, this argument
overlooks the fact that women whose mothers were on AFDC are moreslikely than
other women to be on AFDC simply because the children of the poor are nore likely
to be poor.
Zimmerman and Levine (1993) test the hypothesis that AFDC has no additional
negative effect using data from the original National Longitudinal Surveys and
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. They regress the daughter's
participation in AFOC on measures of maternal participation, maternal income, and
other background variables. Since both maternal AFDC participation and income
are to some extent choices and may be measured with error, they propose the
following instrumental variables (IV) technique: Instrument AFDC participation
using maximum benefit levels in each state, and instrument income using the
Duncan index of the mother and father's occupations.'They find that maternal
AFDC participation has no statistically significant effect on the daughter's
probability of participating, once maternal income is controlled for.
This IV scheme implicitly assumes that women do not migrate in response to
AFDC benefits and that occupational choices are predetermined to a greater extent
than incomes are.The first assumption is reasonable in light of empirical
evidence that migration flows in response to benefit levels are very small
(r'loffitt, 1992). The second is perhaps less defensible. Still, Zimmerman and
Levine's paper is the first to attempt to instrument both participation and
income in a reasonable way and it suggests that it is poverty and not maternal
welfare receipt that creates welfare mothers.
These results suggest that maternal welfare participation does not
encourage teenage pregnancy and child-bearing.'3 Although the teen birthrate
"TheDuncan index is a linear combination of the median earnings and
education associated with an individual's occupation.
"Concernis often expressed that AFDC has contributed to the problem by
undermining family values --bysupporting single parenthood and allowing
teenagers to set up housekeeping on their own once they have a child. The Family
Supp*Drt Act of 1988 eliminated some of the perverse incentives of the system by
requiring all states to establish AF'Dc-tip programs, and to make more strenuous
12has fallen over time (from 90 births per 1000 in 1955 to 54 per 1000 in 1988).
out-of-wedlock births to teenagers increased from 15.1 to 37 per 1000 women aged
15 to 19 over the same period (U.S. DEWS, various years) .Thefact that the rate
of out-of-wedlock pregnancy has increased while the AFOC benefit level has
continued to fall also indicates that there is no simple relationship between the
two. Studies that have examined this question directly reach the sane
conclusion. For example, neither Moore and Caidwell (1977), nor Eliwood and Bane
(1985) were able to find any consistent effect of state benefit levels on the
probability of a teen pregnancy."
There has been comparatively little research linking maternal AFDC
participation to other child outcomes, but the empirical issues are the same.
First, it is necessary to control for some measure of income as well as for AFDC
status since otherwise the estimated effects of participation are likely to
reflect the relative poverty of AFDC mothers- Second, within the group of poor
women, one would like to control for the endogeneity of AFDC status. Blank and
Ruggles (1993) show that only 60% of eligible women actually take-up welfare
benefits.Those who do are likely to differ from those who do not in many
unobservable respects.
Hill and O'Neill (1992) find that, when IV methods are used to control for
AFDC status, AFDC participation has no effect on children's scores on a
standardized test of vocabulary, conditional on income. They do not control for
the potential endogeneity of income. Currie and Cole (1993) use data from the
1979 to 1988 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth )NLSY) to examine
the effect of AFDC participation during pregnancy on the utilization of prenatal
care and birthweight. They attempt to control for selection into the AFDC
program in two ways. First, they instrument AF participation usingstate-level
variation in program characteristics.Second, they focus on the sample of
efforts to establish paternity and extract child-support payments from fathers.
"Mooreand Caidwell also find no effect for the rate at wnich AFDC
applications were accepted.However they did find that the vailabxlxty of
family planning clinics had a significant negative effect on the probabilityof
teen pregnancy.
13children who are siblings and estimate models that control for fixed effects
associated with each mother. This procedure 'differences-out" any fixed maternal
characteristics(such as lack of education)associated with program
participation. Finally, they control for a measure of 'permanent-income" on the
grounds that this is less subject to endogeneity bias than a measure of
contemporaneous income.They do not find any significant effect of AFUC
participation on birthweight. Together, these studies suggest that income fron
AFDC has much the same effect on children as family income from any other source.
ii) The Effects of the EITC
If it is difficult to identify the effects of cash transfers under the
AFDC, identifying the effects of the EITC are even more formidable.The
fundamental problem is that the amount of the credit depends only on the parents'
earnings, and earnings are likely to reflect many unobserved factors relevant to
child well-being. However, the EITC is in many respects similar to the "Negative
Income Tax" (NIT) ,anincome guarantee program that was subjected to exhaustive
scrutiny through a number of large-scale social experiments, although it was
never implemented. This section draws the parallels between the two programs,
and discusses what can be learned about the effects of cash transfers from the
NIT experiments.
Under a NIT, a family who earns no income is guaranteed a minimum level of
income, U.Families with earnings, Y, receive a payment.D, where D=G-t1Y. The
quantity B=G/t1 is referred to as the breakeven level of income since workers who
earn more than B receive no payments. If income is equal to the wage multiplied
by hours worked, and workers face a tax rate t, then workers on the NIT earn w(l-
t-t1) for every hour of work, whereas workers with incomes above B earn w(l-t)
That is, workers on the NIT face a higher implicit tax rate than other workers.
Hence, both the EITC and the NIT work through the tax system to increase the
level and reduce the variance of income among the poor. However, the EITC
differs from the NIT in that the EITC has no income guarantee, and lowers
effective marginal tax rates for the poorest rather than raising them.
In order to investigate whether the NIT created significant work
14disincentives, the Office of Economic Opportunity under President Nixon
authorized 4 large-scale social experiments. The first experiment, in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania, lasted from 1968 until 1972 and involved 1,357 low-income
couples. A rural experiment took place in Iowa and North Carolina from 1969 to
1973 and included 809 low-income rural families.A third experiment was
conducted in Gary, Indiana between 1971 and 1974 and was composed of 1,780
African-American households, 59% of them female-headed. The largest experiment,
which affected 4,800 families, was conducted in Seattle and Denver from 1971 to
1982.
The NIT experiments represented the first large-scale attempt to
investigate social policy using a treatment and control design with random
assignment. Treatments received an income guarantee level and a tax rate. The
guarantees were usually expressed as a percent of the federal poverty line, and
ranged from 50 to 250%. The average payments in the Seattle/Denver experiment,
for example, ranged from $919. to $2031. (1972 dollars) depending on the
treatment group.By way of comparison, the poverty line for a family of 3
persons was $3,099. The NIT experiments provide a unique opportunity to assess
the effects of income transfers per se on the well-being of children in poor
families.
In principle, the use of random assignment overcomes the problem of
selection that is ubiquitous in the program evaluation literature, and allows
the effects of the program to be identified through a simple comparison of
treatments and controls. However, the NIT experiment was flawed in two respects.
First, treatments and controls were randomly assigned only within income
categories. Hence, the cell sizes available for treatment/control comparisons
are very small. Second, controls were much more likely to leave the experiment
than treatments. These two problems mean that much of the NIT data has been
analyzed using conventional non-experimental methods and the results are
sensitive to the way that problems of non-random selection into treatment groups
and attrition are handled (Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990)
These problems may account for inconsistent findings across experimental
15populations and for econometric estimates that are at odds with those derived
from simple comparisons of treatments and controls. For example,Kehrer and
Wolin (1979) find that the mean birthweight of infants born to the treatment
group in the Gary experiment was actually lower than the birthweight of the
controls. Yet estimates from their structural model suggests that the infants
of treatments had higher birthweights in 9 out of 12 maternal age groups.
O'Conner, Madden, and Pringle (1976), examined the effect of the NIT on child
nutrition using data from the rural experiment.Among subjects in North
Carolina, they found positive and significant treatment effects on intakes of
energy, calcium, phosphorus, iron, riboflavin and vitamin C. However, the
treatment did not appear to have any significant effect in Iowa, a finding that
the authors attribute to the relative poverty of the North Carolina sample.
The results from the rural and Gary experiments have also been used to
examine the effect of the NIT on schooling attainment. Maynard and Crawford
(1976) found that elementary school children from NIT families in North Carolina
showed statistically significant improvements in attendance, performance on
standardized tests, and grades.However, there were no effects for older
children or for elementary school children in Iowa. Their results are reproduced
in Table 3. Once again, this pattern of results is attributed to the fact that
the children in North Carolina were much more disadvantaged than those in Iowa.
Maynard and Murnane (1979) found that in the Gary experiment the NIT treatment
had positive effects on the reading scores of younger children but that these
effects were statistically significant only among children whose families had
been in the program for 3 or more years.
Finally, in an analysis of data from the New Jersey experiment, Mallar
(1977) found that teenagers whose parents were enrolled in a NIT plan were
between 20% and 90% more likely to complete high school depending on the
parameters of the plan. This group also completed one-third to one-and-a-half
more years of education than their counterparts in the control group. However,
Venti (1984) found only an 11% increase in the probability of completing
highschool for youth in the Seattle/Denver experiment. This lower estimate seems
16more probable in view of the relatively short duration of the experiments, and
the many longterm factors (such as achievement in early grades) that have been
linked to educational attainment. These results may also be related to the fact
that, in all 4 experiments, youths in treatment households were less likely to
be employed than controls (Robins. 1985)
These studies suggest that the relatively large income transfers made to
poor families under the NIT had a positive effect on the nutritional status, and
on the educational attainment of children, especially among the poorest families.
However, the magnitudes vary so greatly from study to study that it is difficult
to say how large these effects may be. Perhaps unsurprisingly, studies of the
consumption effects of the NIT also suggest that families spent much of the
subsidy on goods that may not have been directly related to the well-being of
their children. For example, the NIT appears to have had a negative effect on
the labor supply of married wome&', and positive effects on housing
expenditures and purchases of consumer durables (Robins, 1985; Michael, 1978)
The NIT may also have increased the probability of marital dissolution, although
this finding remains controversial (c.f. Cain and Wissoker, 1990; Hannan and
Tuna, 1990)
Part 3t th. Effsetiv•n.uu of In-Rind Transfsrs
a) Earmarked Transfers
i) Effects of the Food Stamp Program
It would be surprising to find that the marginal propensity to consume food
out of food stamp income differed from the marginal propensity to consume food
out of cash income because 85 to 90% of participating households have food
expenditures that exceed the value of their FSP benefits.Two experimental
"cashout" programs have suggested that food stamp income is treated exactly like
cash income. However, one of these took place in Puerto Rico where there was a
thriving black market in stamps before the cashout (Moffitt, 1989), and the other
'7No convincing evidence of a link between maternal employment and
children's well-being has been found. See Blau and Grossberg (1990) and Desai
at al. (1989)).
17affected only elderly households (Blanchard, 1982) .Henceit is not clear that
the results of these experiments can be extrapolated to mainland families with
children.
On the other hand, non-experimental evaluations of the fungibility of food
stamps among families with children are contaminated by the failure to properly
control for the endogeneity of program participation. For example, Table 4 shows
that FSP households purchase more nutritious food for home consumption than non-
participating households", but it is not clear whether this is a cause or an
effect of program participation --Itmight be the case that families who
participate care more about nutrition. Since the FSP is federally administered,
all geographic variation in benefits comes from interactions between the AFDC
program and the F'S?. Many researchers have resorted to trying to identify IV
models by finding characteristics of families that affect program participation
without affecting food expenditures. Fraker (1990a) provides a review of this
literature.
Fraker (1990b) is one of the few studies that attempts to use the
geographic variation in FSP benefits to identify the effects of the program. He
finds that in OLS regressions, participation in the FSP has a positive effect on
7 of 16 nutrients examined. When he instruments using maximum F'S? benefits as
one of the instrumental variables, the standard errors rise but the point
estimates stay relatively constant. This result suggests that one might find
positive and significant effects of the FSP given greater variation in benefit
levels or larger samples.
The results of Korenman and Miller (1992) are also inconclusive. They use
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to examine the effect of FSP
participation during pregnancy on birthweight, the incidence of low birthweight,
gestational age, the incidence of prematurity, and mother's weight gain during
pregnancy. They find a statistically significant effect of participation by
women with incomes less than 50% of the poverty lime on birthweight of first born
"Thesedifferences remain when observable characteristics of the household
are controlled for.
18children in OLS regressions. However, they find no effect for children of higher
birth order, or when they control for unobserved characteristics of the mother
using fixed effects models. They also report that the height-for-age of children
whose families received Food Stamps in the year prior to the survey is
significantly lower than that of other children. These results highlight the
importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity when evaluating the
efficacy of social programs.
There are two intriguing hypotheses that have been advanced to explain why
food stamp income might have a different effect on nutrient intakes than cash
income.First, it is possible that households view PS? benefits as a more
permanent source of income than other sources. Second, women with children may
have higher marginal propensities to purchase food than men, and the female head
of household may have more control of Food Stamp coupons (which are likely to be
issued in her name)thanshe has over the household's cash income.'Neither
theory has been subjected to an empirical test.
ii) Effects of HousinO Assistance
Deficient housing can pose a hazard to children's health. For example,
lead poisoning is three times more coimnon among poor children than among non-poor
children and is directly related to housing conditions. The risk of accidental
death is also three times higher, and some of this increased risk maybedue to
hazards in the home (Starfield, 1985). In 1989, 18% of poor households (2.2
million households), lived in housing with severe or moderate physical problems
compared to 7% of non-poor households.2° If housing assistance enables families
in deficient housing to move to adequate housing, then it probably improves the
Some circumstantial evidence pertinent to this hypothesis comes from the
Washington State Welfare Reform Demonstration Program. AFDCrecipientsin
demonstration counties had the option of choosing to receive their AFDCandFood
Stamp benefits in the form of a single consolidated check rather than continuing
to receive Food Stamp coupons.Over 20% of these women opted to continue
receiving the coupons.
°ProblemsHUD classifies as severe include lack of basic plumbing
facilities,serious heating breakdowns, and rat infestations. Anexampleof a
moderate deficiency, is the use of unvented gas, oil, or kerosene heaters as
primaryheating equipment.
19physical well-being of children.
However, little evidence is available on this question. A 1988 HUD study
found that more than half of public housing households lived in projects that
needed moderate to substantial rehabilitation just to meet HTJD's ownstandards.
The estimated cost of bringing these units up to standard would exceed S20
billion 1986 dollars (Lazere et al. 1991) .Mostvoucher programs require
families to locate a landlord willing to participate in the Section 8 program,
and to arrange with the landlord for inspections and repairs within a fixed
period of time. One case study of 56 single mothers in eastern Massachusetts in
1985 and 1986, found that after waiting an average of 2 years to receive a
certificate, 24 women returned them unused because they were unable to find
housing that net program requirements within the allotted time (Mulroy, 1988)
The remaining women were able to improve their housing situations. Data from the
1986 Freestanding Voucher Demonstration program indicates that 60% of eligible
households participated and that 57% of the subsidy went towards increasing
rental payments (Kennedy and Finkel, 1987) .Hence,there is some evidence that
voucher programs may decrease the number of participating households living in
substandard housing •21
1.inaffordable housing can also have harmful effects on children, by
squeezing family budgets. Standards set by federal law define affordable housing
as housing that consumes no more than 30% of a household's adjusted income.22
In 1989, three quarters of poor households in the U.S. paid over 30% of their
income for housing, and more than half spent over 50% (Lazere et al., 1991).
Families on AFDC fare just as badly because in all but 7 states, the maximum AFDC
benefit for a family of 3 is less than HUD's estimate of the •Fair Market Rent"
for a two-bedroom apartment.For families in these circumstances, receiving
housing assistance can effectively double the family's cash income. Meyer et al.
21 Contemporary voucherprograms seem to have larger effects on rental
payments than subsidies offered to families under the Experimental Housing
Program. See Apgar (1990) for a discussion.
22 Adjustments include deductions for dependent children, handicapped or
elderly family members, and for excessive health or child care costs.
20(1993> report that among low-income children attending a Boston clinic, those
living in public housing or receiving rent subsidies are significantly less
likely to suffer from iron anemia. This evidence is consistent with the evidence
from the NIT experiments since it suggests that large cash transfers can improve
the nutritional status of the poorest children.
Finally, in principle, housing assistance can affect children by
influencing the parent's choice of neighborhood and schools. For example,
Johnson (1986) found that recipients of housing allowances frequently moved to
better neighborhoods, although they did not usually move to less segregated ones.
However, it is very difficult to identify the effects of neighborhoods and
schools because any relationship we observe between neighborhood characteristics
and individual outcomes could reflect the characteristics of the individual or
of his or her family that drew them to the neighborhood in the first place.
The Gautreaux program provides a 'natural experiment' that sheds light on
this issue. It grew out of a lawsuit filed in 1966 against the Chicago Housing
Authority and MUD on behalf of public housing residents. The suit charged that
the Chicago low-rent public housing program had been administered in a racially
discriminatory manner. A consent decree established by the Supreme Court in
1976, created a unique demonstration program with the aim of reducing segregation
in Chicago's public housing.
Under the program, residents in public housing projects can apply for
Section 8 housing certificates and move to private apartments. Some apartments
are in predominantly white suburbs, while others are in the inner city. Although
the persons admitted to the program are not a random sample of public housing
residents23, the program assigns apartments in an approximately random manor
since the apartment an applicant is offered depends on what the agency has
available when the applicant reaches the top of the waiting list.Very few
23Applicantsare screened to make sure that they have paid their rent
regularly, and that they have adequate housekeeping abilities. The program does
not serve families with more than 4 children because fewlargehousing units are
available in the suburbs. In addition, the act of applying for an apartment in
an unknown location may indicate that a person is strongly motivated to improve
his or her circumstances.
21applicants turn down an offered apartment, because if they do, they are unlikely
to be offered another.Hence, differences in outcomes between applicants
assigned to the suburbs and those assigned to the city are likely to reflect true
neighborhood effects.
Rosenbaum (1982) found that children of participants who moved to the
suburbs attended schools that were superior in terms of smaller class sizes, and
satisfaction with teachers and courses. On average, these children had better
attitudes towards school, and suffered no permanent decline in grades or
attendance. However, some children had trouble meeting higher academic standards
in the suburbs and were placed in lower grades, lower tracks, or in remedial
education.
The children in the original study were re-interviewed 7 years later
(Rosenbaum (1992)). Unfortunately, only 59% of the original sample Children, or
107 children, could be located, so the estimated program effects may be biased
if there was differential attrition from the two groups. Still, the results are
striking: Children who had moved to the suburbs were 15% less likely to have
dropped out of school, 16% more likely to be in a college-track program, and 34%
more likely to be employed than those who had moved within the inner city. All
of these differences were statistically significant at the 90% level of
confidence. These findings suggest that voucher programs can have a positive
effect on the life chances of children if they enable families to find housing
in better neighborhoods. On the other hand, they suggest that the disamenities
associated with large public housing projects may have significant negative
effects.MUD is currently planning several housing experiments that will be
based on the Gautreawc model.2' An experimental evaluation that tookcare to
minimize attrition could shed great light on the possible beneficial effects of
housing vouchers.
b: In-Kind Programs that Target Specific Services to Children
i) Medicaid
24Personalcorrnunjcation with Susan Mayer, Department of Sociology,
Northwestern University.
22The introduction of Medicaid in 1966 coincided with decreases in infant
mortality, increases in hospitalization rates for poor children, and an increase
in the frequency of doctor visits for poor relative to non-poor children
(Danzinger and Stern, 1990; Starfield, 1985) The timing of the decrease in
infant mortality is suggestive but not completely compelling evidence of a
beneficial effect of Medicaid on the health of poor children because infant
mortality periodically falls sharply in response to technological change.
Time-series evidence regarding the numberofdoctor visits is also difficult to
interpretsincevisits for illness reflect both morbidity and utilization of
care.This section reviews recent evidence that Medicaid coverage improves
access to preventive care and that these gains are related to declines in the
prevalence of low birthweight and infant mortality.
Currie and Thomas (1993a) use the 1986 and 1988 waves of the National
Longitudinal Survey's Child Mother file (NLSCM) to examine the relationship
between insurance coverage and whether a child had a routine checkup in the last
6 months. As discussed above, visits for preventive care are a more satisfactory
measure of utilization than the total number of doctor visits since they do not
depend on illness. In each year, mothers were asked whether their child's health
care was covered by either Medicaid or by private insurance. The ability to
distinguish between Medicaid and private insurance is useful because children
with private health insurance coverage tend to be better off in observable (and
presumably also in unobservable) dimensions than children with Medicaid coverage.
Hence, if Medicaid has a stronger effect on the utilization of preventive care
than private health insurance coverage, then this is strong evidence that the
estimated effect reflects insurance coverage rather than omitted characteristics
correlated with selection into the Medicaid programs.
Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the probability that a child had a
routine checkup are shown in Table 5. These regressions include dummy variables
for both Medicaid coverage and private health insurance coverage. The excluded
For example, up to half of the decline in infant mortality between 1989
and 1990 may be due to the introduction of surfactant therapy --atreatment for
premature infants suffering Repiratory Distress Syndrome (Horbar, 1993)
23category is no insurance. The models also include a full set of interactions
with an indicator equal to one if the child is African-American.This
specification is equivalent to estimating separate models for whites and African-
Americans. but allows a ready comparison of the effects of insurance coverage on
the two groups. The complete set of control variables is listed in the table
notes.
Medicaid coverage is estimated to increase the probability of a routine
checkup among white children 3 to 5 years of age by 13%. In contrast, African-
American children on Medicaid are between 8% and 15% more likely to receive a
checkup at all ages. On the other hand, there are no statistically significant
differences between children with private health insurance coverage and those
without health insurance coverage, except among white children of school age.
This result may reflect the fact that many private insurance policies do not
cover preventive pediatric care (Mitchell and Schurman, 1984). so that children
may not receive regular preventive care until they enter the school system.
These OLS models do not control for selection into the program. It is
possible to do better using these data, because in many cases, there are repeated
measures of the same child. Currie and Thomas (l993a) also estimate conditional
logit models that include fixed effects for each child. These models control for
any unobserved characteristics of the child (such as the education of the mother
or innate sickliness) that may be correlated with program participation, and
examine the effects of changes in Medicaid and private insurance status on
changes in the probability of receiving a checkup. The estimates are remarkably
similar to the OLS estimates discussed above.
Another way to control for selection into the Medicaid program is to
identify the effects of Medicaid using state-level variation in the coverage of
pregnant women and children. As discussed in Part 1, the Federal government
began expanding the Medicaid coverage of pregnant women and children beginning
in 1984.By January 1992, a uniform, minimum floor for coverage had been
established that was 2 to 3 times higher than the floor that had existed in the
average state only 4 years earlier.However, this floor was raised at very
24different rates in different states.
Currie and Gruber (1993) use data from The National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, Vital Statistics, and the Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine the
impact of the Medicaid expansions on the usage of prenatal care, the incidence
of low birthweight, and infant mortality. Using CPS data, they first construct
two measures of the generosity of State Medicaid programs in each year. The
first is the fraction of women aged 15 to 44 who would have been eligible for
Medicaid had they become pregnant. The second controls for non-programmatic
sources of heterogeneity between States by drawing a random sample of U.S. woman
in each year and calculating the fraction that would have been eligible under
each state's rules. Using this second measure they find evidence that a 20%
increase in the fraction of women eligible for Medicaid would be associated with
a 4% decrease in the probability that the initiation of prenatal care was delayed
beyond the first trimester. Turning to state-level data from Vital Statistics,
they also find that the Medicaid expansions were associated with improvements in
birth outcomes: A 20% increase ineligibilitydecreased the incidence of low
birthweight and infant mortality by 2% and 7% respectively.
One caveat to these positive results is that early expansions of Medicaid
coverage to poor women who had been ineligible for AFDC for reasons of family
structure (e.g. single pregnant women without eligible children) had much greater
effects on the incidence of low birthweight than later extensions of coverage to
women with incomes between 100% and 185% of the poverty line. Their analysis
of self-reported Medicaid coverage in the CPS suggests that many women in the
lattergroup did not take-up their new benefits. On the other hand, both types
of expansions decreased infant mortality rates. Currie and Gruber use data on
Medicaid expenditures to infer that at least some of the decline in mortality
associatedwith the later expansions was due to increased utilization of high-
tech hospital services during and after birth rather than increased utilizatIon
of preventive care.
ii) WIC
WIC is more interventionist than traditional welfare programs: Eligibility
25is often determined by medical examinations and blood tests, and nutritional
counseling is required. In addition, the types and even brands of foods that can
be purchased using Wit coupons are strictly controlled. Many studies find that
WIC has positive effects on the utilization of prenatal care and on measures of
infant health including birthweight, the incidence of low birthweight,
gestational age, and infant mortality.2'
Schranim (1985) and Devaney et al. (1990) examine the effects of WIC on the
Medicaid costs of newborns. The results are of particular interest because they
can be used to compare the costs and benefits of the WIC program. Schramm found
that in 1980 a dollar spent on WIC reduced Medicaid costs in Missouri by
approximately $.80 in the first 30 to 45 days after birth. Devaney et al.
examine Medicaid costs in the first 60 days after birth. Their study examined
all Medicaid births in 1987 for Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, and South
Carolina, as well as births from January through June 1988 in Texas. The authors
examine women covered by Medicaid, comparing those who were enrolled in WIC to
those who were not.Limiting the study to Medicaid eligibles is likely to
eliminate some but not all of the observed and unobserved differences between WIC
participants and non-participants. The average costs for newborns and their
mothers in the 60 days after birth ranged front $2433. to $3822. depending on the
state. The reductions in Medicaid costs for newborns and their mothers that were
associated with WIC participation ranged from $277. to $598. As Table 6 shows,
the reductions in Medicaid costs more than offset the costs of providing WIC to
these women.
Unfortunately, only two WIC studies, by Metcoff et al. (1985) and Caan et
al. (1987), have used random assignment to generate a comparison group. Studies
that do not use random assignment suffer from the fact that participants may
differ from non-participants in unobserved ways. If WIC participants are worse
off than non-participants because places are scarce and only the neediest are
admitted into the program, then studies that compare WIC participants and non-
participants will under-estimate the effects of the program. Conversely, if WIC
2SeeDevaney, Bilheimer and Schore (1991) for a review.
26participants are more highly motivated or better informed than non-participants,
then studies of this type may over-estimate the program's effects.
Without knowing more about the selection mechanism underlying participation
it is difficult to assess the probable direction of this bias. However, given
that the program is locally administered, the factors governing selection into
the Wit program are likely to differ considerably over time and across sites.
These factors might include the probability of a doctor referral, the extent to
which Wit places are rationed, the amount of advertising, the location of WIC
providers, and so on. Hence, the fact that the estimated effects are remarkably
constant across samples drawn from different states at different times suggests
that the positive results are not entirely driven by the selection of women who
are likely to have good outcomes into the program.
Although studies of the effects of Wit on the nutrient intakes of children
generally find positive effects of WIC participation (c.f. Fraker (1990)), these
studies are also plagued by possible selection bias. One way to control for
selection effects is to follow the same child over time. The Centers for Disease
Control (1978) report the results of a study that followed child WIC participants
in 6 states over a two year interval. The study found that after 3 WIC visits
the percent of children who were anemic fell from 23% to 10% among children 6 to
23 months of age, and from 24% to 12% among children 24 to 59 months old. In
addition, 21% of 6 to 23 month old children entering the program were below the
tenth percentile of length-for-age --afterthree WIC visits, only 15% of these
children were below this cutoff.
Hicks et al. (1982) report encouraging results from a small-scale study of
the effects of WIC participation on later cognitive development. They note that
previous studies have established a link between severe malnutrition, protein
deficiencies, or anemia, and cognitive deficits. The question is to what extent
the less severe malnutrition or anemia that night be present in a U.S. population
of poor children presents a threat to child development? Their study focuses on
21 pairs of siblings from rural Louisiana. Because of the design of the WIC
program in that state, the younger child in each pair waseligible for
27supplementation beginning in the third trimester of pregnancy, while the older
child became eligible for IC only after the first year. The results show that
the 'early supplementation' group had significantly higher scores on tests of
verbal ability and IQ, and on a Draw-A-Person' test.
It is possible that these results are biased by the fact that it was always
the younger child that received the early supplementation. Eowever, when the
authors use measures that were taken when the two children were the same age,
such as their grade point averages in grade one and their heights-for-age, they
still find that early supplementation has a significant effect. They note that
in general there is a slight negative association between parity and IQ, so the
finding that the younger children had higher IQ's is unlikely to be solely an
artifact of birth order.
iii) School Nutrition Programs
In 1979 a bi-partisan Senate committee requested the Secretary of
Agriculture to commission a study of school nutrition programs. This request
resulted in the National Evaluation of School Nutrition Programs (NESNP). which
surveyed students, parents, and school food service administrators.
Hanes et al. (1984) use the NESNP to compare the nutritional content of the
breakfasts and lunches of participants and non-participants. They also examine
nutrient intakes over a 24 hour period in order to assess the extent to which
families compensate for school meals by reducing the child's home food
consumption.They find that school lunches contain more of almost all the
nutrients that were examined than non-participant lunches.School lunch
participants also have higher 24 hour nutrient intakes, which indicates that
families do not entirely offset the effects of food supplementation.
The effects of the School Breakfast Program are less striking.School
breakfasts contain more calcium, phosphorus, protein, and magnesiumthanother
breakfasts.But they have less vitamin A, B, Niacin, thiamin and iron.
Children who have a school breakfast have higher 24 hour intakes of calcium and
phosphorus than those who have another breakfast, which indicates that the
initial gains in intakes of other nutrient are ofset over the course of the day.
28However, the availability of a school breakfast does have a positive effect on
the probability that a child eats breakfast, and children who eat breakfast have
higher 24 hour nutrient intakes than children who do not.
The differences in the effects of the NSLP and the SEP on nutrient intakes
probably reflect differences in Federal standards.Lunches must conform to
Federally determined "meal patterns" that specify the types, amounts, and methods
of preparation of food. The standards for breakfasts are much looser, perhaps
because the government wishes to encourage school districts to participate. The
two nutrients that are consumed in greater quantities over a 24 hour period by
school breakfast participants are both found in milk, which is a compulsory
component of the breakfast meal pattern (Radkowski and Gale, l984b) .Hence,it
seems that the effectiveness of the school nutrition programs is directly related
to the strictness of the federal guidelines governing them.
Surprisingly, there have been few attempts to evaluate the effects of
school nutrition programs on cognitive outcomes. In one of the more compelling
studies, Meyers et al. (1988) examined 1092 third to sixth grade children in
Lawrence, Massachusetts before and after the SEP was introduced in their school
in 1987. They found that the Breakfast Program participants showed greater
improvements on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills, relative to their initial
scores, than non-participant children. SEP participation also reduced tardiness.
iv) Head Start
McKey at al. (1985) provide one of the most recent surveys of the Head
Start literature. Much of the research focuses on assessing cognitive gains.
The consensus of 72 experimental studies is that Head Start has positive effects
on IQ and measures of "school readiness" that fade out by the end of the third
grade.However, as discussed above, experimental evaluations of long-term
outcomes may be severely biased by attrition from the sample. Also, most studies
do not provide separate analyses by race, although racial differences in the
levels of scores on standardized tests suggest that the effects of Head Start may
differ by race.
Currie and Thomas (1993b) use data from 1986, 1988, and 1990 waves of the
29NLSCM to investigate the longer-term cognitive effects of Head Start.They
provide one of the first analyses of the Head Start program based on a large
national sample of children who attended regular Head Start programs. About 2%
of white children, 16% of Hispanic children and 27% of African-American children
in their sample participated. They find some evidence of longer-term cognitive
gains to participation in Head Start: Head Start appears to have a positive
effects on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) scores of white and
Hispanic children over 8 years old. However, there are no effects on the PPVT
scores of African-American children or on the mathematics or reading scores of
any children in this age group.
Estimates based on differences between siblings are shown in Table 7.
These models control for unobserved characteristics coimnon to both children by
including a fixed effect for each family. These models also include an indicator
variable equal to one if a child attended another type of preschool. Currie and
Thomas find that even within the same family, children tend to attend preschool
when the family is relatively well off. In contrast, they attend Head Start when
the family is relatively disadvantaged. Hence, the fact that Head Start has a
greater impact on test scores than preschool attendance suggests that the
estimated effect is unlikely to be an artifact of patterns of selection into the
two types of programs.
Currie and Thomas also find that past participation in Head Start reduces
the probability that white and Hispanic children 10 years and older reported
repeating a grade. Estimates from models with family fixed effects are shown in
Table 8.Attendance at a non-Head Start preschool has no effect on the
probability of grade repetition. These results are consistent with those of
Copple, Cline, and Smith (1987) who followed children in 33 Philadelphia schools
from school entry up to grade 6 and found that children who had participated in
Head Start were 3 to 12% less likely to have repeated a grade (depending on the
sample) .Theywere also less likely to have been placed in remedial education.
In addition, Head Start children had 2 to 23% fewer absences and were more likely
to be present when standardized tests were administered. It would be useful to
30replicate these results in other data sets since 70% of the students in Copple,
Cline and Smith's initial sample had been lost by the time they reached the sixth
grade, and their estimates may be subject to severe attrition bias.
In addition to improving cognitive attainment, Head Start aims to "provide
a comprehensive health services program which includes a broad range of medical
services. .." (HeadStart Bureau, 1992) -Thirty-fourstudies reviewed by McKey
et al. provide qualitative evidence that children in Head Start are more likely
than non-participants to receive routine checkups, dental care, arid screenings
for speech, language, developmental delays, vision, and hearing.
Currie and Thomas (1993b) provide quantitative analyses of the effects of
Head Start participation on the probability of having been immunized against
measles as of 1990 and on height-for-age. In addition to mandating the provision
of preventive medical care, the Head Start program performance standards state
that "every child in a part-day program will receive a quantity of food in
meals.. .and snacks which provides at least 1/3 of daily nutritional needs..,"
(Head Start Bureau, 1992) .Bothnutritious food and better medical care are
expected to improve child growth.Hence, there is some reason to expect a
positive effect of participation in Head Start on child height as well as on
immunization rates.
Figure 4 shows non-parametric estimates of the relationship between Head
Start and preschool status, permanent income2', and immunization status in 1990.
The figure shows that for white and African-American children, the probability
of having been immunized against measles is significantly higher at all income
levels for children who were in Head Start relative to those who went to other
2 Currje and Thomas (l993b) define permanent income as the 1ogarith1T of
average annual household income between 1978 and 1990 (in real 1990 dollars)
Use of this measure should attenuate the influence of measurement error and
breaks the link between household income at a point in time and eligibility for
the Head Start program. Household permanent income is about $29,000 for the
average white child, $23,000 for Hispanics and $18,000 for African-Americans in thissample.
31preschools." The latter are, in turn, more likely to have been immunized than
those who did not attend any preschool. Among Hispanics, both children who went
to Head Start and those who went to other preschools are more likely to have been
immunized then those who did not attend any preschool." Although they do not
have data about the utilization of other preventive care services, Currie and
Thomas suggest that if Head Start children are more likely to receive
immunizations, they may be also be more likely to receive the other services
mandated by the program.Finally, they show that, conditional on household
permanent income, children who attended Head Start are significantly taller than
those who attended no preschool. These benefits of Head Start persist when
family fixed effects are controlled for: Head Start participation is associated
with increases in the probabilities that white and African-American children
receive measles shots of 10% and 12% respectively, and African-American children
who attended Head Start are significantly taller than their siblings who did
not.
4. Conc1uaion
The current state of knowledge about the effects of welfare programs on
child well-being is summarized in Table 9.The table presents a matrix of
programs and outcomes: Each cell shows what we know about the effects of a
particular program on a given outcome.For brevity's sake, only positive
findings have been reported in the table. The most striking feature of Table 9
"Figures2 and 3 show locally-weighted smoothed scatterplots (LOWESS)
(Cleveland, 1979) which are a nearest neighbor-type estimator. Essentially, each
observation is replaced by its predicted value based on a weighted regression
using the observations in a band around it. Hence the shape of the estimated
function is determined locally throughout the distribution of income (See, also,
Hardle, 1990)
'Allthese differences are statistically significant at the 95% level of
confidence.
"Thesefixed effects estimates may be biased downwards if there is
measurement error, or if there are positive spill-over effects from one child to
another.
32is that there are many empty cells --weclearly need to learn a great deal more
about how these programs work before we can make informed public P01icy.
However, the cells with entries do tell a consistent story: Programs that
target services directly to children have the largest measured effects, while
unrestricted cash transfer programs have the smallest. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
families seem to treat cash transfers the same way that they treat other cash
income --expenditureson goods that directly increase the well-being of Children
may increase, but so do expenditures on other goods. As a result, large cash
transfers under the NIT program had only small and inconsistent effects on the
nutrition and schooling attainment of poor children.
Programs that provides transfers to parents that are earmarked for specific
purposes also appear to have uncertain effects. There is little evidence that
participation in the Food Stamp Program increases the nutrient intake of poor
children, although it has not been proven that itdoesnot. The evidence on
housingprograms is mixed: On the one hand, the physical condition of public
housing may be superior to that of alternative housing, and the cash value of the
transfermay be very largerelative to the size of the family's income. On the
otherhand, the disaxnentiesassociated with large public housing complexes are
notorious. The Gautreaux experiment suggests that voucher programs that enable
families to move to better neighborhoods may have large positive impacts on
schooling attainment and employment probabilities. But difficulties in accessing
Section 8 housing probably prevent many families from realizing potential
benefits. Finally, Medicaid, WIC, the School Lunch Program, and Head Start all
have demonstrable positive effects on poor children.
One glaring omission from the current study is that there has been no
discussion of multiple program participation. Many children are covered by more
thanoneprogram.For example, AFDC participantsare covered by Medicaid and are
automatically eligible for Food Stamps.As of 1990. half ofAFDC children
receivedfree school lunches, 35% lived in public or subsidized rental housing,
and 19% participated in WIC. Conversely, half of all Food Stamp recipients 42%
ofMedicaidrecipients, 38% of WIC recipients, and 24% of those in public housing
33also received AFDC. Moffitt (1992) estimates that in 1984, 26.4% of nonelderly
single-parent families received AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamps, and 11% received
at least one benefit in addition to AFDC. It is impossible to say how multiple
program participation affects the child outcomes discussed above since there has
been virtually no research on this topic.
At this point it is instructive to consider the COStS as well as the
benefits of two policy options. It is unlikely that AFDC benefit levels will be
raised in the near future given the unpopularity of the program. However, there
has been discussion of raising the EITC to "guarantee a working wage so that rio
American who works full-time is forced to raise children in poverty" (Clinton and
Gore, 1992).In 1992, a family of four with one earner working full time at
$5.00 per hour (approximately the minimum wage) would have required a credit of
$4000. to bring them up to the poverty line. In fact, such a family received a
credit of approximately $1400. A very crude calculation is that increasing the
generosity of the program three times would raise the cost from the current 7
billion to 21 billion dollars. And this increase would only benefit children of
working parents.
A second policy that has been much discussed, is extending the benefits
provided by targeted programs to all poor children. In the absence of additional
reforms, the Medicaid expansions that have already been Implemented will cover
all poor children by the turn of the century.If there are approximately 12
million poor children and 28% of them are uninsured31, and if the average cost
of covering these children is equal to the current cost of covering an AFDC
child, then the cost of the Medicaid expansions will be about $2.3 billion. The
costs of expanding WIC and Head Start to all eligible children would be $1.5 and
$4.5billionrespectively. Finally, it would cost $.8 billion to restore the
cuts that have been made in the School Lunch Program. Hence, if a choice had to
be made, these calculations suggest that the more cost effective policy would be
to increase expenditures on targeted programs.
31 In 1988, 17% of all children and 28% of children with family incomes less
than $10,000 were without health insurance coverage of any kind (Bloom, 1990).
3435mbl. 1 rendgin Progra1!xp.nditurs. (billions 1990 S)'
Program 1975 1980 1990
Cash Tranifsr5
AFDC (total) 20.4 19.0 18.5
(federal only) 11.2 10.2 10.1
Earned Income TaX Credit (total) 3.2 3.2 6.9
(refunded portion of credit) 2.2 2.2 5.3
Zarmark.d Transf.rI
10.22 13.8 15.1 Food stamps
Housing Assistance 6.3 8.6 10.6
Targst•d Tran.f.ri
30.6 40.9 72,5 4edicaid (total)
(federal only) 17.2 23.2 41.1
(to dependent children) 5.4 5.i 9.1
(to adults in families 5.1 5,53 8.6
with dependent children)
wic .6 .7 2.1
School Lunch 4.5' 4.8 3.7
Head Start 1.0 1.1 1.6
Notes:
These figures were taken from U.S. House of Representatives (1992). pages 654, 1019,1616,1651,
1680, 1684, and 1689, 1695.
The figure for 1975 include, administrativecosts.The figure.for1980 and1990do not.
These figures are for 1981.
These figures are for 1977.
36Tabl• 2Caa.load. for 8 Larg.P.d.ral Program.(million.)










Earned Income Tax Credit
(* families> 6.2 7.0 13.3
Earmarksd Tran.f.r.
Food stamps (total recipients) 16.3 19.2 20.0






















School Lunch (* any meals)







Head Start .4 .4 .6
Notes:
These figures are for 1977.
37rabi. 3iSchoolPerformanc. in ths Rural Experinsnt
Djff.r.nc.5 b.tw..nTr.atm.nts and Control.
a.a P.rcantof Control Nsan
Grad.. 2-8 Grad.. 9-12
North North
Msalur. Carolina Io,.a Carolina Iowa
Days absent -20 3 —17
Academic Grades 6* 5 4 5
Achievement Tests 19** -18.8 n.e. n.e.
(deviation from norm)
Source: Maynard and Crawford (1976) .Therewere 847 children.
* Significantat the 90% level of confidence.
**Significantat the 95% level of confidence.
n.e. Not estimated due to lack of data.
Table 4
Household Nutrient Availability as a Percentage
of the RDA for Persons Eating in the Households
FSP Participants FSP Nonparticipants Difference
Nutrient (a) (b) (a-b)
Food Energy 139% 121% +18%
Protein 232 203 +29
Calcium 119 111 +8
Iron 151 137 +14
Magnesium 134 123 +11
Phosphorous 202 183 +19
Vitamin A 213 178 +35
Thiamin 194 165 +29
Riboflavin 204 180
Vitamin B6 132 114 +18
Vitamin B12 235 191 +44
Vitamin C 290 264 +26
Source: Fraker (1990a).
38Table 5: OLS Estim&tes of the Effecte of Medicaid and Private
Health Xnsuraiica on the Probability of a Routine Checkup
(1) (2) (3)
Child Age in 88: 1—3 3—5 5-9
Intercept .226 .712 .104
(.237) (.290) (.290)
African-American .238 -.027 -.406
(.387) (.482) (.447)
Type of Insurance
Medicaid .044 .133 .043
(.036) (.039) (.037)
African-American .051 -.052 .102
*Medicaid (.061) (.069) (.060)
Private Ins. .031 .005 .069
(.028) (.033) (.032)
African-American -.008 -.044 -.046
*PrivateIns. (.054) (.063) (.056)
Maternal Characteristics
Permanent Income -.004 -.057 -.040
(.023) (.027) (.027)
African-American .034 .005 .041
*Income (.039) (.048) (.044)
Top Grade in 88 .021 .019 .017
(.006) (.008) (.008)
African-American -.014 -.004 .019
*TopGrade (.014) (.017) (.015)
R—Squared .035 .044 .033
* Observations 2183 2260 2642
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.All regressions also
included: The mother's AFQT score; an indicator equal to 1 if she
was in the poverty sample; an indicator equal to 1 if the mother
lived in an urban area at age 14; the child's gender; county income
per capita; the number of physicians per 1000 state residents; the
number of hospital beds per 1000 state residents; the state infant
mortality rates; dummy variables for residence in the northeast,
south, or west; an indicator equal to one if the data came from the
1986 survey and zero otherwise; and interactions of all these
variables with the indicator for African-Americans. Since
observations from both the 1986 and 1988 NLSCM surveys have been
pooled, a control for the earlier survey was included to allow for
possibledifferences between the two waves.
Source: Currie and Thomas (1993a)













Newborns and Mothers $347 $196 1.77
Minnesota






















Medicaid costs are from birth to 60 days after birth.
Al1 estimates are statistically significant at the .01 level (two-tail test)
except in Minnesota, where the estimate is statistically significant at the 07
level (two—tail test) and at the .03 level (one-tail test).
Medicaid costs refer to hospital costs only.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Tala 8: Head Start Effects on Grade Repetition,




Head Start —.51 —.03 -.46
(2.27) (.31) (2.96)
Other preschool -.08 -.17 -.005
(.67) (1.34) (.02)
Log Income .08 -.14 -.38
at Age 3 (.75) (1.10) (2.04)
Male —.06 —.13 —.01
(.97) (1.93) (.09)
Age in Months .004 -.001 .01
1990 (1.45) (.35) (1.91)
First Born -.13 .05 -.16
(1.35) (.57) (1.20)
# Observations 269 311 141
R-squared .63 .59 .65
Mean Dep. Var. .36 .47 .32
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
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